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Abstract
I estimate a search-and-bargaining model of a decentralized market to quantify the
effects of trading frictions on asset allocations, asset prices and welfare, and to quantify
the effects of intermediaries that facilitate trade. Using business-aircraft data, I find
that, relative to the Walrasian benchmark, 18.3 percent of the assets are misallocated;
prices are 19.2-percent lower; and the aggregate welfare losses equal 23.9 percent.
Dealers play an important role in reducing trading frictions: In a market with no
dealers, a larger fraction of assets would be misallocated, and prices would be higher.
However, dealers reduce aggregate welfare because their operations are costly, and they
impose a negative externality by decreasing the number of agents’ direct transactions.
∗I am grateful to Ricardo Lagos, Jonathan Levin, Gianluca Violante, Pierre-Olivier Weill, the co-editor
and two anonymous referees, and many seminar audiences for useful comments and discussions. Mi Luo
provided excellent research assistance.
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1 Introduction
How large are trading frictions? How do they affect the allocations and prices of assets,
and the welfare of market participants? What is the role of intermediaries in reducing
trading frictions? Do they increase welfare? This paper estimates a structural model of a
decentralized market to provide quantitative answers to these questions.
Many assets trade in decentralized markets. Classic examples are financial assets such
as bonds and derivatives, consumer durable goods such as cars and houses, and firms’ cap-
ital assets such as plants and equipment. The fundamental characteristics of decentralized
markets are that agents must search for trading partners and that, once a buyer and a seller
meet, they must bargain to determine a price. Moreover, in response to trading frictions,
almost all decentralized markets have intermediaries. Indeed, starting with Demsetz (1968),
trading frictions have been used to explain the existence of intermediaries. The key role of
intermediaries in such markets is to improve allocations by reducing frictions, but, since their
operations are costly, intermediaries’ effect on aggregate welfare may be ambiguous (Hsieh
and Moretti, 2003; Budish, Cramton, and Shim, 2014; Leslie and Sorensen, 2014; Pagnotta
and Philippon, 2011).
In this paper, I lay out a model of trading in decentralized markets with two-sided search
and bilateral bargaining to study the effects of trading frictions on asset allocations, asset
prices and welfare, as well as the role of intermediaries in these markets. I then quantify the
role of frictions and of dealers, estimating this model using data on business jet aircraft.
The theoretical framework combines elements from Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) and
Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2005), extending them to capture key features of real asset
markets, such as the heterogeneity of assets due to depreciation. Gains from trade arise
from heterogeneous valuations of holding an aircraft: A flow of agents enters the market
in every period, seeking to acquire an aircraft, whereas aircraft owners wish to sell their
assets when their valuations drop. Buyers contact sellers at a rate that depends on the
mass of aircraft for sale and on agents’ search ability, and they contact dealers at another
rate that reflects dealers’ inventories and search ability. Trading frictions generate profitable
opportunities for dealers, since they can gain arbitrage revenues by shortening the time that
agents have to wait in order to trade (Grossman and Miller, 1988; Rubinstein and Wolinsky,
1987); however, dealers’ entry imposes a negative externality on agents by lowering their
direct meeting rates.1 When agents meet or meet dealers, they bargain over the terms of
1Thus, the paper focuses on dealers’ advantage over direct exchange in lowering trading delays; see
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trade.
Equilibrium allocations and prices depend in an intuitive way on agents’ and dealers’
search abilities, bargaining powers and valuations. Specifically, while in a first-best Wal-
rasian market with no delays, only high-valuation agents own aircraft and dealers are not
active, trading frictions imply that some low-valuation agents own aircraft and dealers hold
inventories, depressing asset prices, as well. Moreover, while dealers increase welfare by fa-
cilitating the reallocation of assets from low-valuation sellers to high-valuation buyers, in
a free-entry equilibrium, dealers’ entry may be excessive from a social point of view, and
this excessive entry is more likely to arise when dealers enjoy greater bargaining power
(Von Weizsacker, 1980; Mankiw and Whinston, 1986).
I estimate the model by using data on the secondary market of business jet aircraft—
a typical decentralized market. The data are well-suited to studying the effects of search
frictions and the role of intermediaries. In particular, they report the number of aircraft for
sale and number of aircraft transactions in each month, and their ratio is informative on
the magnitude of trading delays. Similarly, the data report dealers’ inventories and dealers’
transactions, and their ratio is informative on the role of dealers in reducing delays. In
addition, the data report two series of prices: retail prices between final users of the aircraft;
and wholesale prices between aircraft owners (as sellers) and dealers (as buyers). Their
differences are useful in understanding how much dealers are able to command by supplying
immediacy of trade.
The estimation reveals that trading delays are non-trivial: On average, aircraft stay
on the market approximately eight months before a seller is able to finalize a sale. The
quantitative importance of these delays depends on how frequently agents seek to trade,
determined by a drop in their valuations; this happens, on average, every five years. The
estimation further implies that the dealers enjoy strong bargaining power, capturing almost
the entire surplus of transactions.
I use the estimated parameters to simulate two counterfactual scenarios. In the first one, I
quantify the effects of trading frictions on asset allocations, asset prices and aggregate welfare
by computing a Walrasian market equilibrium, in which the highest-valuations agents always
own all assets. The estimates imply that trading frictions generate moderate inefficiencies.
Compared to the Walrasian benchmark, new-aircraft prices are 19.26-percent lower, and
Section 4.2 for empirical evidence on this. Intermediaries may also increase the match-specific value between
buyers and goods (Shevchenko, 2004) and may also ameliorate the consequences of asymmetric information
(Biglaiser, 1993). However, intermediaries feature prominently in several markets, such as financial markets,
in which match-specific values and asymmetries of information between parties play a minor role.
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18.3 percent of all business aircraft are misallocated: 13.2 percent are on the market for sale,
whereas, for 5.1 percent of all aircraft, the trading frictions are larger than sellers’ expected
gross gains from trade; thus, their low-valuation owners prefer to keep them rather than
put them on the market for sale. Moreover, aggregate welfare in the estimated model is
23.98-percent lower than that in the Walrasian market. The decomposition of this welfare
loss indicates that 13.38 percent of the welfare difference is due to the misallocation of assets
to lower-valuation users; 10.32 percent is due to dealers’ costs, and only 0.28 percent is due
to the agents’ search costs.
In the second counterfactual, I examine the quantitative effect of dealers on the decen-
tralized market equilibrium, comparing it to a decentralized market with no dealers. This
comparison indicates that dealers have a sizable effect on asset allocations and asset prices:
In a market without them, 20.6 percent of the assets would be misallocated, and prices
would increase by 2.88 percent. Overall, the net effect of dealers is a welfare loss equal to
9.66 percent of aggregate welfare of the estimated model. The reason for this result is that,
while dealers improve the allocation of assets, they extract almost all gains from trade. Many
dealers enter the market to capture these arbitrage profits and, in a free-entry equilibrium,
their aggregate costs become larger than their aggregate benefits, since they appropriate
surplus that would be created by agents trading directly. Hence, an interesting conclusion of
this counterfactual analysis is that it may be incorrect to make aggregate welfare statements
by looking exclusively at asset allocations.
This paper makes two main contributions. First, it provides a framework suited to
empirically analyzing decentralized asset markets with intermediaries. Search models have
proved useful in understanding key features of labor markets, and, more recently, researchers
have started to apply search models to financial markets. To my knowledge, this paper is
the first to estimate a bilateral search model that investigates the microstructure of the
market for a capital asset/durable good, quantifying the effects of trading delays and of
intermediaries. Second, the empirical findings suggest that, even within a well-defined asset
class such as business aircraft, trading frictions are a non-trivial impediment to the efficient
allocation of assets and have significant effects on asset prices. Thus, the paper innovates on
recent works that study the process of asset reallocation (Ramey and Shapiro, 1998, 2001;
Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001; Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2006; Gavazza, 2011a,b) by quantifying
its inefficiencies. Moreover, the empirical results highlight that the costs of intermediation
can be larger than the aggregate gains from a more-efficient allocation, since intermediaries
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expend resources to capture the rents that trading frictions generate.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 presents
some institutional details on the business-aircraft market. Section 4 introduces the data.
Section 5 presents the theoretical model, and Section 6 estimates it. Section 7 performs the
counterfactual analysis. Section 8 concludes. Appendix A reports on patterns of trade in
the data, and Appendix B contains details of the calculations of the standard errors and of
the confidence intervals. The Online Appendix provides the analytical solution of the model
with the assumption of no depreciation.
2 Related Literature
This paper contributes to the important literature that analyzes decentralized markets.
The theoretical literature is vast. The most closely related papers examine bilateral search
markets, in which both buyers and sellers search for a trading counterpart, and prices are
determined through bilateral bargaining (Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1985, 1987; Gale, 1987;
Mortensen and Wright, 2002; Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen, 2005, 2007; Miao, 2006). The
main focus of these theoretical papers is to investigate whether the equilibrium converges
to the competitive outcome as frictions vanish. To my knowledge, this paper is the first to
estimate a bilateral search model of a real asset market to quantify the effects of trading
frictions—i.e., the focus of the theoretical literature.
The paper further contributes to the literature on intermediaries. Several papers in-
vestigate the role of brokers/dealers in financial markets and their inventory-management
policies; for a survey, see O’Hara (1995). Spulber (1999) provides a thorough analysis of in-
termediaries between customers and suppliers. Weill (2007) presents a search-and-bargaining
model to understand how intermediaries provide liquidity by accumulating inventories when
selling pressure is great, and then dispose of those inventories after that selling pressure has
subsided. Recent empirical analyses of non-financial intermediaries include Hall and Rust
(2000), who focus on the inventory investment of a single steel wholesaler, and Gavazza
(2011a), who focuses on the role of lessors in reallocating commercial aircraft. To my knowl-
edge, this paper presents the first structural empirical analysis of the role of intermediaries
in a search-and-bargaining framework, quantifying their effects on asset allocations, asset
prices, and aggregate welfare. The empirical results complement those of other papers that,
in different settings, find that intermediaries’ entry may be excessive from a welfare point
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of view: See, among others, Hsieh and Moretti (2003), Budish, Cramton, and Shim (2014),
Leslie and Sorensen (2014), and Pagnotta and Philippon (2011).
This paper is also related to the empirical literature on the structural estimation of
search models. Most applications focus on labor markets. Eckstein and Wolpin (1990)
pioneered this literature by estimating the model of Albrecht and Axell (1984). Eckstein
and Van den Berg (2007) provide an insightful survey of this literature. One key difference
between the current paper and previous research is that this paper seeks to understand
how search frictions affect the level of asset prices and of asset allocations (and the role of
intermediaries), while most papers that structurally estimate labor-market search models
focus on how search frictions affect wage dispersion across workers (notable exceptions are
Gautier and Teulings, 2006, forthcoming). Search models have also been applied to housing
markets, with Carrillo (2012) being the closest empirical paper.
Finally, this paper is related to a few that investigate aircraft transactions. Using data on
commercial-aircraft transactions, Pulvino (1998) finds that airlines under financial pressure
sell aircraft at a 14-percent discount, and that distressed airlines experience higher rates of
asset sales than non-distressed airlines do. Using data on business jets similar to the data
that I use in this paper, Gilligan (2004) finds empirical evidence consistent with the idea
that leasing ameliorates the quality of used aircraft traded on secondary markets. Gavazza
(2011b) empirically investigates whether trading frictions vary with the size of the asset mar-
ket in commercial-aircraft markets. However, none of these papers quantifies the magnitudes
and the welfare effects of trading frictions by estimating a structural model.
3 Business-Aircraft Markets
For several reasons, the business-aircraft market is an interesting context in which to
investigate the effects of search frictions and the role of intermediaries.
First, used business aircraft trade in decentralized markets, organized around privately-
negotiated transactions. Almost all buyers (and sellers) are either wealthy individuals or
corporations that use the aircraft to fly their executives. To initiate a transaction, a prospec-
tive seller must contact multiple potential buyers or sell its aircraft to a dealer. For buyers,
comparing two similar aircraft is costly since aircraft sales involve the material inspection of
the aircraft, which could be in two different locations. Thus, aircraft markets share many
features with other over-the-counter markets for financial assets (mortgage-backed securities,
corporate bonds, bank loans, derivatives, etc.) and for real assets (real estate), in which trad-
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ing involves material and opportunity costs (Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen, 2005, 2007).
Moreover, compared to financial markets and other equipment markets, business-aircraft
markets are “thin”: Slightly more than 17,000 business jet aircraft were operated worldwide
in December 2008. In thin markets, the search costs to find high-value buyers are usually
large (Ramey and Shapiro, 2001; Gavazza, 2011b).
Second, intermediaries play an important role in mediating transactions. Most interme-
diaries operate as brokers who match buyers and sellers. Some intermediaries operate also
as dealers, acquiring aircraft for inventories. To the best of my knowledge, in the U.S., there
is no regulation preventing a potential dealer from entering the market and competing with
the incumbents. For example, most U.S. states require an ‘aircraft dealer’ license, but that
is simply a license that allows dealers to acquire aicraft for inventory without paying sales
tax. Most foreign jurisdictions have similar regulations.
Finally, business aircraft are registered goods with all major “life” events (date of first
flight, maintenance, scrappage, etc.) recorded, so detailed data are available. In the next
section, I describe them.
4 Data
Patterns in the data suggest that trading delays are an important feature of aircraft
markets. Moreover, the available data dictate some of the modeling choices of this paper.
Hence, I describe the data before presenting the model. This description also introduces
some of the identification issues that I discuss in more detail in Section 6.
4.1 Data Sources
I combine two distinct datasets. The first is an extensive database that tracks the history
of business-aircraft transactions. The second reports the average values of several aircraft
models, similar to “Blue Book” prices. I now describe each dataset in more detail.
Aircraft Transactions—This database is compiled by AMSTAT, a producer of aviation-
market information systems.2 It provides summary reports that track business-aircraft mar-
ket transactions. For each month from January 1990 to December 2008 and for each model
2http://www.amstatcorp.com/pages/pr stat.html.The website states: “AMSTAT’s customers are
aircraft professionals, whose primary business is selling, buying, leasing and/or financing business aircraft,
as well as providers of related services and equipment.”
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(e.g., Cessna Citation V or VI), the dataset reports information on the active fleet (e.g.,
the number of active aircraft; the number of new deliveries); information on aircraft for sale
(e.g., the number of aircraft for sale, by owners and by dealers; the average vintage); and
information on completed transactions (e.g., the total number of transactions; the number
of retail-to-retail, retail-to-dealer, dealer-to-dealer and dealer-to-retail transactions). The
dataset also reports the main characteristics of each aircraft model (e.g., average number
of seats, maximum range, fuel consumption). I restrict the analysis to business jets, thus
excluding turbo-propellers.
Aircraft Prices—I obtained business-aircraft prices from the Aircraft Bluebook Historical
Value Reference.3 This dataset is an unbalanced panel, reporting quarterly historic values
of different vintages for the most popular business-aircraft models during the period 1990-
2008. Two series are reported: average retail prices and average wholesale prices. Average
retail prices report prices between final users of the aircraft, and average wholesale prices
report average transaction prices between an aircraft owner (as a seller) and a dealer (as a
buyer). All prices are based on the company’s experience in consulting, appraisal and fleet
evaluation. All values are in U.S. dollars, and I have deflated them using the GDP Implicit
Price Deflator, with 2005 as the base year.
It is important to note that the construction of the Aircraft Bluebook Historical Value
Reference implies that the retail and wholesale price series are free of several biases. First,
wholesale prices refer to sales to dealers—thus before dealers could make any improvement
to the aircraft. Second, the database reports historical retail and wholesale prices, even for
those model-vintage pairs for which only one unit (i.e., one serial number) exists, suggesting
that the price series are not affected by sellers’ selection based on aircraft quality (observable
or unobservable to both trading parties) or on their valuations.
4.2 Data Description
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the main variables used in the empirical analysis.
Panel A refers to the Aircraft Transactions Dataset, a sample containing 161 models (the
definition of a model is quite fine in this dataset) comprising a total of 26,125 aircraft model-
month observations.4 For each model, the stock of Active Aircraft equals approximately
3The dataset is available at http://www.aircraftbluebook.com. The website describes the dataset
as: “The Aircraft Bluebook Historical Value Reference is specifically designed for lease companies, bankers,
aircraft dealers, or anyone who needs to know the pricing history of an individual aircraft.”
4The quantitative analysis in Section 6 does not exploit the cross-sectional differences across models.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Panel A: Transactions (N=26, 125) Mean St. Dev. Median Min. Max.
Models of Aircraft 161
Active Aircraft 90.13 107.45 49 1 593
Aircraft for Sale 10.95 15.13 6 0 140
–by Owners 7.77 11.95 4 0 112
–by Dealers 3.18 4.78 2 0 50
Average Age, Aircraft for Sale 18.48 11.06 19 0 43
Retail-to-Retail Transactions 0.59 1.12 0 0 14
Retail-to-Dealer Transactions 0.83 1.48 0 0 16
Dealer-to-Dealer Transactions 0.28 0.78 0 0 16
Dealer-to-Retail Transactions 0.84 1.50 0 0 18
Total Number of Transactions 1.43 2.30 0 0 23
Panel B: Prices (N=30, 706)
Models of Aircraft 72
Retail Price (in $1,000) 7, 978 8, 523 4, 702 308 55, 800
Wholesale Price (in $1,000) 7, 070 7, 577 4, 172 258 49, 500
Age (in Years) 12.70 8.20 12 0 30
Notes—This table provides summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis. Panel
A presents summary statistics for the Aircraft Transactions dataset. Each observation represents
a model-month pair. Panel B presents summary statistics for the Blue Book prices dataset. Each
observation represents a model-vintage-quarter tuple. Aircraft prices are in thousands of U.S.
dollars and have been deflated using the GDP Implicit Price Deflator, with 2005 as the base year.
90 units. In a given month, approximately 11 out of these 90 aircraft are for sale: eight by
owners and three by dealers. The number of transactions is small relative to the number of
aircraft for sale: On average, there are 0.59 Retail-to-Retail Transactions and 0.83
Dealer-to-Retail Transactions per model-month pair (I include lease transactions in
Dealer-to-Retail Transactions). There are also a few Dealer-to-Dealer Trans-
actions—0.28 per month, on average—suggesting that dealers smooth their inventories by
trading with other intermediaries. The Total Number of Transactions, defined as
the sum of Retail-to-Retail Transactions and Dealer-to-Retail Transactions,
indicates that, on aggregate, approximately 1.5 aircraft per model trade in a given month
and that a dealer is the seller to the final retail user in approximately 60 percent of these
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transactions.
Panel B provides summary statistics for the Aircraft Prices dataset. This sample con-
tains 72 models (indicating that the definition of a model is coarser than in the Aircraft
Transactions Dataset), comprising a total of 30,706 aircraft model-vintage-quarter observa-
tions. The average Retail Price of an aircraft in the sample is 7.9 million (year 2005)
dollars, and the average Wholesale Price is 7.0 million (year 2005) dollars. Moreover,
there is substantial variation in both prices, reflecting both across-model and across-vintage
variation: The standard deviation of retail prices is 8.5 million dollars and of wholesale prices
is 7.5 million dollars. Nonetheless, the difference between Retail Price and Wholesale
Price is always positive within observations.
The two datasets provide a rich description of the business-aircraft market, providing
insights into the motives for trade in this market. Specifically, Appendix A reports on three
related patterns that indicate that the main determinant of secondary-markets transactions
is changes in owners’ valuations of the assets—versus the alternative that these transactions
are due to replacements of depreciated units with higher-quality ones, as in, for example,
the car market; see Stolyarov (2002) and Gavazza, Lizzeri, and Roketskiy (2014).
1. In asset markets in which replacement is the main motive for trade, comparative statics
across different models imply that assets with faster depreciation have higher resale
rates. The argument is as follows. Agents with heterogeneous willingness-to-pay for
vertically-differentiated vintages wish to replace their durables when they depreciate,
but trading frictions are an impediment to instantaneous (100 percent) trade. When
there are transaction costs in the secondhand market, the volume of trade is higher
when different vintages are more imperfect substitutes. A faster rate of depreciation
increases the vertical differentiation between vintages, thereby increasing the volume
of trade. Instead, when valuation shocks are the main motives for trade, resale rates
are uncorrelated with assets’ depreciation rates. See Table 6 in Appendix A.
2. A similar cross-sectional comparative static of a framework in which replacement is the
main motive for trade is that assets with greater depreciation should be traded earlier
“in their life.” Since a faster rate of depreciation increases the vertical differentiation
between vintages, owners replace assets with faster depreciation rates at younger ages
than they replace assets with slower depreciation rates. Instead, when valuation shocks
are the main motives for trade, the age of traded used assets is uncorrelated with assets’
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depreciation rates. See Table 7 in Appendix A.
3. Many vintages are on the market simultaneously, including the youngest ones; see
Figure 7 in Appendix A. This pattern contrasts with the evidence from other asset
markets in which replacement purchases are the main motives for trade, such as the
car market. In particular, in the car market, the fraction of cars sold is lowest for
the youngest vintages (Porter and Sattler, 1999; Stolyarov, 2002). The reason is that,
because of transaction costs, few households sell their cars one year after purchasing
them.
The data present additional patterns that are suggestive of the nature of these valuation
shocks. Specifically, aggregate trading volume and prices are positively correlated, and
time on the market is negatively correlated, with the value of the S&P 500 index. These
correlations are consistent with the ideas that corporate demand for aircraft depends on
the stock-market valuation of the corporation; and that wealthy individuals face significant
exposure to aggregate stock-market fluctuations, thereby affecting their demand—an idea
consistent with broader evidence on their consumption reported in, among others, Mankiw
and Zeldes (1991) and Parker and Vissing-Jørgensen (2009).
Overall, these empirical patterns inform the model to focus on valuations’ shocks as the
main motive for trade.5 Moreover, the data are well-suited to investigating the importance
of frictions and the role of dealers. Specifically, three key patterns suggest that trading
delays may be non-trivial and that dealers reduce them. First, the difference between the
number of Aircraft for Sale (on average, 11 aircraft per model-month) and the Total
Number of Transactions (on average, 1.5 per model-month) means that aircraft stay on
the market for several months before selling, indicating that trading delays are substantial.
Second, the ratio between Retail-to-Dealer Transactions and Aircraft for Sale
by Dealers is higher than the ratio between Total Number of Transactions and
Aircraft for Sale, suggesting that dealers are faster than owners at turning aircraft
over.Third, the difference between the Retail Price and the Wholesale Price is quite
large (on average, 13 percent), corroborating that frictions are relevant in this market and
that dealers are able to command a substantial markup by supplying immediacy of trade.
5Several newspaper articles provide anecdotal evidence that several young aircraft trade exactly because
of valuations shocks. For example, the Financial Times reports on October 20, 2014: “Tesco took delivery of
the aircraft [...] this month. Yet, when the Financial Times reported the aircraft’s delivery at the beginning
of October, it heightened shareholders’ unease about how the struggling retailer was managed. Tesco was
quick to announce that the new jet and the rest of the company’s fleet were all up for sale.”
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With all their advantages, however, the datasets pose some challenges. In my view, the
main limitation is that both datasets provide aggregate statistics of the market for different
models. This limitation implies that a model with rich heterogeneity of agents and deal-
ers, while theoretically feasible, would not be identified with these aggregated data. For
example, the aircraft-price dataset does not allow the identification of rich heterogeneity in
asset valuations, which would be possible if transaction prices were available.6 Therefore,
the model admits a parsimonious binary distribution of valuations, high and low, and fo-
cuses on valuations’ shocks as the main motive for trade. Similarly, the aircraft-transaction
dataset reports only aggregate dealers’ inventories, limiting the possibilities of identifying
heterogeneity across dealers. In Section 8, I discuss the implications of agents’ and dealers’
limited heterogeneity for the interpretation of the empirical results. Finally, an additional
limitation is that the aircraft-transaction dataset does not report whether retail buyers or
sellers hired a broker to search for trading counterparts, although these intermediaries are
popular in business-aircraft markets.
5 Model
In this section, I lay out a model of a decentralized market with two-sided search to
theoretically investigate the effects of search frictions on asset allocations, prices and welfare.
The model combines elements from Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) and Duffie, Gaˆrleanu,
and Pedersen (2005), extending them to capture key features of real asset markets, such as
the depreciation of assets.
I explicitly model frictions of reallocating assets. In particular, each agent contacts
another agent randomly, and this is costly for two reasons: 1) There is an explicit cost cs
of searching; and 2) there is a time cost, in that all agents discount future values by the
discount rate ρ > 0.
5.1 Assumptions
Time is continuous and the horizon infinite. A mass µ of risk-neutral agents enters the
economy at every instant. All entrants have a valuation z = zh > 0 for an aircraft. This
valuation parameter is a Markov chain, switching from zh to zl < zh with intensity λ; zl is
6Some of this heterogeneity may depend on whether the aircraft owner is a corporation or an individual.
Specifically, agency conflicts between managers and shareholders may generate a wedge between the valuation
of the user of the aircraft versus the financier in the case of corporate-owned aircraft.
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an absorbing state. The valuation processes of any two agents are independent. Hence, the
steady-state mass of high-valuation agents equals µ
λ
.
A constant flow x < µ of new aircraft enters the economy at every instant, and x
high-valuation agents entering the economy purchase them at the (endogenous) price p∗.
Aircraft depreciate continuously over time and become worthless when they reach age T,
but they could be endogenously scrapped earlier. Thus, the endogenous total mass A of
aircraft is, at most, equal to xT. I assume that µ
λ
> xT, implying that µ
λ
> A, which
means that the “marginal” owner in a Walrasian market is a high-valuation agent. An
aircraft of age a generates an instantaneous flow of utility equal to pi (z, a) to its owner with
valuation z. The function pi (z, a) satisfies the following: 1) It is increasing in the valuation
z, pi (zh, a) > pi (zl, a) ; 2) it is decreasing in the age a of the asset,
∂pi(z,a)
∂a
< 0; and 3)
it exhibits negative complementarity between the valuation z and the age a of the asset,
∂pi(zh,a)
∂a
< ∂pi(zl,a)
∂a
.
Each agent can own either zero or one aircraft.7 Agents can trade aircraft: A given
agent wishing to trade (either a buyer or a seller) pays a flow cost cs while searching for a
counterparty.8 While searching, he makes contact with other agents pairwise independently
at Poisson arrival times with intensity γ > 0. Thus, given that matches are determined at
random, the arrival rate γs for a seller (the rate at which he meets buyers) is γs = γµb, and
the arrival rate γb (a) for a buyer (the rate at which he meets sellers of an age-a aircraft)
is γb (a) = γµs (a), where µb and µs (a) are the endogenous equilibrium masses of buyers
and sellers of an age-a aircraft, respectively. Thus, the aggregate matching function exhibits
increasing returns to scale. I further assume that agents cannot both use an asset and search
for a new one at the same time.9
In addition, there is an endogenous mass µd of independent used-aircraft dealers that
meets agents also through a search process. Each dealer has a flow cost equal to k and
has, at most, one unit of inventory.10 An agent wishing to trade meets dealers pairwise
7Hence, I do not consider quantity decisions, as do Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2005, 2007); Miao
(2006); Vayanos and Wang (2007); Vayanos and Weill (2008); and Weill (2007). See Lagos and Rocheteau
(2009) for a model that considers quantity decisions.
8The main role of the search cost cs is to avoid swaps of assets. For example, a low-valuations agent with
a young aircraft and a high-valuation agent with an old aircraft may want to swap their assets. However, a
positive flow cost of search cs eliminates these transactions with small gains from trade.
9This assumption greatly simplifies the derivation of the equilibrium allocations and prices, and the
quantitative and welfare implications of allowing agents to use the old aircraft and look for a new one should
be small.
10The assumption of constant-returns and unit inventory is useful to gain tractability, but it does not
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independently at Poisson arrival times with intensity γ′ > 0. Thus, a buyer meets a dealer
with a vintage-a aircraft to sell at rate γbd (a) = γ
′µdo (a), and a dealer with an aircraft to
sell meets a buyer at rate αds = γ
′µb, where µdo (a) is the endogenous mass of dealers with
a vintage-a aircraft to sell. The rates γbd (a) and αds represent the sum of the intensity of
buyers’ search for dealers and dealers’ search for buyers. A seller meets a dealer willing to
buy an aircraft at rate γsd = γ
′µdn, and a dealer willing to buy an aircraft meets a seller of
an aircraft of age a at rate αdb (a) = γ
′µs (a) , where µdn is the endogenous mass of dealers
with an aircraft to sell. There is free entry into the dealers’ market.
Once a buyer and a seller meet, or one of them meets a dealer, parties negotiate a price
to trade. I assume that a buyer and a seller negotiate a price according to generalized Nash
bargaining, with θs ∈ [0, 1] denoting the bargaining power of the seller. Similarly, when an
agent meets a dealer, they negotiate a price, and θd ∈ [0, 1] denotes the dealer’s bargaining
power.11
5.2 Solution
There are four types of agents in the model economy and two types of dealers: high- and
low- valuation owners and non-owners, and dealers with and without an aircraft for sale. I
denote their types ho, lo, hn, ln, do, dn, respectively.
The owner of an age-a aircraft with valuation z can keep operating it, put it up for sale,
or scrap it. In the first case, he enjoys the utility flow pi (z, a). In the second case, he meets
potential trading partners at rate γs and a dealer at rate γsd. In the last case, he becomes
an agent with no aircraft. Owners prefer to sell their assets when their valuations are low
and the assets are relatively young since the complementarity between valuation z and age
a in the flow utility pi (z, a) means that the gains from trade between buyers and sellers are
larger for younger aircraft. Moreover, high-valuation owners scrap their old aircraft, seeking
to purchase newer ones. Similarly, an agent with no aircraft can meet active sellers of age-a
aircraft at rate γb (a) and a dealer at rate γbd (a) , or he can exit the market. Non-owners
choose to search when their valuation is high, and they purchase only relatively young assets.
affect the main welfare results of the papers, since dealers’ free-entry condition implies that dealers’ expected
margins equal their average costs. Aircraft prices allow me to compute dealers’ margins and, thus, obtain an
estimate of average dealers’ costs, which holds irrespective of the assumption of dealers’ level of inventories.
11The model assumes symmetry of information about the quality of the asset. Several institutional
features of aircraft markets support this assumption. First, the aviation authorities often regulate aircraft
maintenance. Second, maintenance records are frequently available, and all parties can observe the entire
history of owners of each aircraft. Finally, all transactions involve a thorough material inspection of the
aircraft.
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Dealers without inventories operate similarly to buyers, and dealers with inventories operate
similarly to sellers, with the key difference that dealers do not enjoy utility from holding
assets, and their opportunity costs differ from buyers’ and sellers’; thus, their choice of
which assets (i.e., vintages) to purchase differs.
I now formally derive the value functions for all agents in the economy and the transaction
price at which trade occurs. These value functions allow me to pin down the equilibrium
conditions and derive the endogenous distribution of owners’ valuations. This distribution
describes how frictions generate allocative inefficiencies and affect aircraft prices.
5.2.1 Agents’ Value Functions
Let Uho (a) be the value function of an agent with valuation zh who owns an aircraft of
age a and is not seeking to sell it. Uho (a) satisfies:
ρUho (a) = pi (zh, a) + λ (Vlo (a)− Uho (a)) + U
′
ho (a) . (1)
Equation (1) has the usual interpretation of an asset-pricing equation. An agent with
valuation zh enjoys the flow utility pi (zh, a) from an aircraft of age a. At any date, one
possible event, at most, might happen to him: At rate λ, his valuation drops to zl, in
which case he chooses between continuing to operate the aircraft (enjoying the value Ulo (a))
and actively seeking to sell it (enjoying value Slo (a)). Thus, the agent obtains a value
Vlo (a) = max {Ulo (a) , Slo (a)} and a capital loss equal to Vlo (a) − Uho (a) . Moreover, the
aircraft depreciates continuously, so that the agent has a capital loss equal to U ′ho (a).
Similarly, the value function Sho (a) of an agent with valuation zh who owns an aircraft
of age a and is actively seeking to sell it satisfies:
ρSho (a) = pi (zh, a)− cs + λ (Vlo (a)− Sho (a)) + γsmax {p (a) + Vhn − Sho (a) , 0}+
γsdmax {pB (a) + Vhn − Sho (a) , 0}+ S
′
ho (a) . (2)
An agent with valuation zh enjoys the flow utility pi (zh, a) from an aircraft of age a, but
he pays the flow cost cs while actively seeking to sell it. At any date, one of three possible
events might happen to him: 1) At rate λ, his valuation drops to zl. In this case, the agent
chooses between keeping the aircraft (enjoying the value Ulo (a)) and actively seeking to sell
it (enjoying value Slo (a)). Hence, the agent obtains a capital loss equal to Vlo (a)− Sho (a) .
2) At rate γs, the agent meets a potential buyer and chooses between trading the aircraft or
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keeping it. If he trades it at price p (a), he becomes a high-valuation non-owner with value
Vhn, thus obtaining a capital gain equal to p (a) + Vhn − Sho (a) . If he keeps it, he obtains a
capital gain of zero. 3) At rate γsd, he meets a dealer and chooses between trading the aircraft
or keeping it. If he trades it at price pB (a), he then chooses between actively searching for
another aircraft or not, thus obtaining a capital gain equal to pB (a) + Vhn − Sho (a) . If he
keeps it, he obtains a capital gain of zero. Moreover, the aircraft depreciates continuously,
so that the agent has a capital loss equal to S ′ho (a).
The value functions Ulo (a) and Slo (a) of an agent with valuation zl who owns an aircraft
of age a satisfy the following Bellman equations, respectively:
ρUlo (a) = pi (zl, a) + U
′
lo (a) , (3)
ρSlo (a) = pi (zl, a)− cs + γsmax {p (a) + Vln − Slo (a) , 0}+
γsdmax {pB (a) + Vln − Slo (a) , 0}+ S
′
lo (a) . (4)
The interpretation of equations (3) and (4) is now straightforward. An agent with valuation
zl enjoys the flow utility pi (zl, a) from an aircraft of age a. If he does not seek to sell the
aircraft, the only event that affects his utility is the depreciation of the aircraft, with capital
loss U ′lo (a) . If he seeks to sell the aircraft, the search cost cs reduces his flow utility. Then,
at any date, he meets a potential buyer at rate γs, in which case he chooses between selling
the aircraft at price p (a)—thus obtaining a capital gain equal to p (a) + Vln − Slo (a), where
Vln = max {Uln, Sln}—or keeping it—thus obtaining a capital gain of zero. Similarly, he
meets a dealer at rate γsd, in which case he chooses between trading the aircraft at price
pB (a)—thus, obtaining a capital gain equal to pB (a) + Vln − Slo (a)—or keeping it—thus
obtaining a capital gain of zero. Moreover, the aircraft depreciates continuously, so that the
agent has a capital loss equal to S ′lo (a).
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The value functions of high- and low-valuation agents with no aircraft satisfy:
ρShn = −cs + λ (Vln − Shn) +
∫
γb (a)max {Vho (a)− p (a)− Shn, 0} da+ (5)∫
γbd (a)max {Vho (a)− pA (a)− Shn, 0} da,
ρUhn = 0, (6)
ρSln = −cs +
∫
γb (a)max {Vlo (a)− p (a)− Sln, 0} da+ (7)∫
γbd (a)max {Vlo (a)− pA (a)− Sln, 0} da,
ρUln = 0. (8)
Equation (5) says that a high-valuation agent with no aircraft who is paying the search cost cs
has a capital loss equal to Vln−Shn when, at rate λ, his valuation drops from high to low; has
a capital gain equal to max {Vho (a)− p (a)− Shn, 0} when, at rate γb (a) , he meets a seller of
an aircraft of age a; and has a capital gain equal to max {Vho (a)− pA (a)− Shn, 0} when, at
rate γbd (a) , he meets a dealer selling an aircraft of age a, where Vho (a) = max {Uho (a) , Shn} .
Since the hn-agent does not know the age of the aircraft that the counterparty will have,
he takes expectation over the possible capital gains that arise from the different vintages.
Similarly, equation (7) says that a low-valuation agent with no aircraft, who is paying
the search cost cs to search for a counterparty, has an expected capital gain equal to
max {Vlo (a)− p (a)− Sln, 0} when he meets a potential seller of an aircraft of age a, and
an expected capital gain equal to max {Vlo (a)− pA (a)− Sln, 0} when he meets a dealer.
Equations (6) and (8) say that agents without aircraft who are not searching have a zero
value.
5.2.2 Dealers’ Value Functions
As in Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987), dealers can extract surplus by shortening the
time that buyers and sellers have to wait in order to trade. They are capacity-constrained
and cannot hold more than one aircraft. Thus, the value functions Jdo (a) and Jdn of dealers
with and without an aircraft for sale, respectively, satisfy:
ρJdo (a) = max {−k + αds (pA (a) + Jdn − Jdo (a)) + J
′
do (a) , ρJdn} , (9)
ρJdn = −k +
∫
αdb (a)max {Jdo (a)− pB (a)− Jdn, 0} da. (10)
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Equation (9) says that a dealer who owns an aircraft of age a pays the flow cost k and chooses
between two alternatives: 1) He can actively seek to sell it, meeting a potential buyer at
rate αds. In this case, the dealer trades the aircraft at a negotiated price pA (a), obtaining a
capital gain equal to pA (a) + Jdn − Jdo (a) . Moreover, the dealer has a capital loss equal to
J ′do (a) because the aircraft depreciates continuously; or 2) he can scrap the aircraft, thereby
becoming a dealer without an aircraft for sale.
Similarly, equation (10) says that a dealer without an aircraft pays the flow cost k while
he actively seeks to purchase one. At rate αdb (a) , this dealer meets a potential seller of an
aircraft of age a, in which case the dealer decides whether or not to trade, thus enjoying a
capital gain equal to max {Jdo (a)− pB (a)− Jdn, 0} . Since the dn-dealer does not know the
age of the aircraft that the counterparty will have, he takes expectation over the possible
capital gains that arise from the different vintages.
Dealers’ free entry requires that Jdn = 0—i.e., dealers’ expected capital gain is exactly
equal to their fixed operating cost.
5.2.3 Prices
When a buyer and a seller meet and agree to trade, the negotiated price,
p (a) = (1− θs) (Slo (a)− Vln) + θs (Uho (a)− Shn) , (11)
is the solution to the following symmetric-information bargaining problem:
max
p(a)
[Uho (a)− p (a)− Shn]
1−θs [p (a) + Vln − Slo (a)]
θs
subject to: Uho (a)− p (a)− Shn ≥ 0 and p (a) + Vln − Slo (a) ≥ 0.
Similarly, the ask and bid prices pA (a) and pB (a) satisfy:
pA (a) = (1− θd) (Jdo (a)− Jdn) + θd (Uho (a)− Shn) , (12)
pB (a) = (1− θd) (Jdo (a)− Jdn) + θd (Slo (a)− Vln) . (13)
Finally, the price p∗ of new assets is such that new entrants are indifferent between paying
the price p∗ and searching on the secondary market:
Uho (0)− p
∗ = Shn.
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Hence, new assets trade at a premium relative to all used assets because of differential
frictions between the primary market and secondary markets.
5.2.4 Agents’ and Dealers’ Policies
We can simplify the value functions of all types of agents {ho, lo, hn, ln} recognizing that
gains from trade may arise only when high-valuation non-owners meet low-valuation owners.
Moreover, since the flow utility pi (z, a) exhibits complementarity between agents’ valuation
z and the age a of the asset, the gains from trade are larger for younger assets. In turn, this
implies that, depending on parameters, it is possible that not all assets trade in equilibrium.
Indeed, Section 6 will show that not all assets trade in the estimated model, so I focus on
this case.
Specifically, since Uho (a) is decreasing in a, there exists a cutoff age a
∗
ho such that ho-
agents scrap their asset when it reaches age a∗ho—i.e., a
∗
ho satisfies Uho (a
∗
ho) = Shn. Moreover,
a cutoff age a∗hn determines whether or not hn-agents purchase an age-a asset. Trading
frictions generate a wedge that implies that a∗hn ≤ a
∗
ho. Thus, high-valuation owners’ value
functions are:
Vho (a) =
{
Uho (a) for a < a
∗
ho,
Shn for a ≥ a
∗
ho.
The policy of lo-owners satisfies a cutoff rule, as well. Specifically, since the flow utility
pi (zl, a) is decreasing in the age a of the asset, whereas the flow search cost cs is constant, there
exists a cutoff age a∗l such that lo-agents sell their aircraft if it is younger than a
∗
l , but keep it
if it is older—i.e., Ulo (a) > Slo (a) if a < a
∗
l , Ulo (a
∗
lo) = Slo (a
∗
lo) and Ulo (a) < Slo (a) if a > a
∗
l .
Equilibrium requires that lo-agents sell assets that hn-agents are willing to purchase—thus,
a∗l ≤ a
∗
hn. Moreover, since lo-agents enjoy positive utility from these old assets, they keep
them until they reach the scrappage age T. Thus, the low-valuation owners’ value functions
are:
Vlo (a) =


Slo (a) for a < a
∗
l ,
Ulo (a) for a ≤ a
∗
l < T,
Vln for a = T.
Non-owners’ value functions are:
Vhn = Shn,
Vln = 0.
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Similar arguments also apply to dealers. Their value function Jdo (a) is decreasing in a
because younger aircraft sell at greater margins, as the gains from trade are larger. Thus,
since dealers’ fixed cost k is independent of the age of the asset, there exist two cutoff ages
a∗dn and a
∗
do such that dealers do not purchase aircraft older than a
∗
dn and scrap aircraft when
they reach age a∗do. Since the asset purchase price is sunk at the time of scrapping it, but not
at the time of buying it, a∗dn < a
∗
do. Moreover, equilibrium requires that dealers sell assets
that buyers are willing to purchase. Hence, a∗do ≤ a
∗
hn.
5.2.5 Distribution of Agents
Let µi (a) be the masses of owners of age-a aircraft whose state is i ∈ {ho, lo, do} , and
let µi be the masses of non-owners whose state is i ∈ {hn, ln, dn} . The masses of owners
evolve over time according to the following system of differential equations:
µ˙ho (a) = (γb (a)µhn + γbd (a)µhn)− λµho (a) for a < a
∗
ho, (14)
µ˙lo (a) = λ1 (a < a
∗
ho)µho (a)− γs1 (a < a
∗
l )µlo (a) + (15)
−γsd1 (a < min {a
∗
l , a
∗
dn})µlo (a) for a < T,
µ˙do (a) = αdb (a) 1 (a < a
∗
dn)µdn − αdsµdo (a) for a < a
∗
do, (16)
with initial conditions µho (0) = x and µlo (0) = µdo (0) = 0, and terminal conditions µho (a) =
0 for a∗ho ≤ a < T and µdo (a) = 0 for a
∗
do ≤ a < T. The notation 1 (Y ) represents an indicator
function equal to one if the event Y is true, and zero otherwise.
The intuition for these equations is as follows. Equation (14) states that the mass of
high-valuation agents with an age-a asset is the result of flows of three sets of agents: 1)
the inflow of high-valuation non-owners that found a seller of an age-a aircraft—the term
γb (a)µhn; 2) the inflow of high-valuation non-owners that found a dealer selling an age-a
aircraft—the term γbd (a)µhn; and 3) the outflow of high-valuation age-a aircraft owners
whose valuation just dropped—the term λµho (a) . Equation (14) already incorporates the
equilibrium outcomes that low-valuation owners of an age-a aircraft are willing to sell it
rather than keep it (i.e., γb (a) > 0) and that dealers have inventories of age-a aircraft (i.e.,
γbd (a) > 0) only if high-valuation non-owners are willing to buy them (i.e., a < a
∗
hn).
Equation (15) states that the mass of low-valuation agents with an age-a asset is the
result of flows of three sets of agents: 1) the inflow of high-valuation agents whose valuation
just dropped. Since high-valuation agents scrap the oldest assets, this inflow applies only to
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owners of assets younger than a∗ho—hence the term λ1 (a < a
∗
ho)µho (a); 2) the outflow of low-
valuation aircraft owners who prefer to sell their aircraft rather than keep it (i.e., an aircraft
of age a < a∗l ) and who have found a buyer (this buyer is willing to purchase it because
a∗l ≤ a
∗
hn)—hence the term γs1 (a < a
∗
l )µlo (a) ; and 3) the outflow of low-valuation aircraft
owners who prefer to sell their aircraft rather than keep it (i.e., an aircraft of age a < a∗l )
and who have found a dealer willing to purchase it (i.e., an aircraft of age a < a∗dn)—hence
the term γsd1 (a < min {a
∗
l , a
∗
dn})µlo (a) . The intuition for equation (16) is similar.
Moreover, the masses of high-valuation non-owners and dealers without inventories evolve
over time according to:
µ˙hn = (µ− x) + µho (a
∗
ho)− λµhn − µhn
∫ a∗
l
0
γb (a) da− µhn
∫ a∗
dn
0
γbd (a) da,
µ˙dn = αds
∫ a∗
do
0
µdo (a) da− µdn
∫ min{a∗l ,a∗dn}
0
αdb (a) da+ µdo (a
∗∗
dn) ,
whereas, in each instant, the mass of ln-agents equals:
µln = λµhn + γs
∫ a∗
l
0
µlo (a) da+ γsd
∫ min{a∗l ,a∗dn}
0
µlo (a) da+ µlo (T ) .
Steady state imposes the following constraints on the evolution of these masses: 1) The
aggregate masses of owners
∫ T
0
µi (a) da for i ∈ {ho, lo, do} and the aggregate masses µhn
and µdn are constant over time; 2) the mass µln of exiters equals the mass µ of new en-
trants; 3) the total mass of agents with high valuation µhn +
∫ T
0
µho (a) da equals
µ
λ
; 4)
the total mass of dealers µd equals
∫ T
0
µdo (a) da + µdn; 5) the aggregate masses of as-
sets sold and purchased by dealers equal the aggregate masses of assets purchased from
and sold to dealers: µhn
∫ a∗
do
0
γbd (a) da = αds
∫ a∗
do
0
µdo (a) da and µdn
∫ min{a∗l ,a∗dn}
0 αdb (a) da =
γsd
∫ min{a∗l ,a∗dn}
0 µlo (a) da; and 6) dealers’ aggregate inventories do not change over time:
µhn
∫ a∗
do
0
γbd (a) da = µdn
∫ min{a∗l ,a∗dn}
0 αdb (a) da. In addition, equilibrium requires that the
total mass of owners of age-a aircraft µho (a) + µlo (a) + µdo (a) equals the mass x of aircraft
for a ≤ min {a∗do, a
∗
ho} , and µho (a) + µlo (a) + µdo (a) < x for a > min {a
∗
do, a
∗
ho} .
All these steady-state equalities and the equilibrium condition µho (a)+µlo (a)+µdo (a) ≤
x allow us to solve for the endogenous masses as a function of the exogenous parameters
x, T, µ and λ, and the exogenous parameters of the matching functions.
Letting γ increase, limγ→+∞ µlo (a) converges to 0: When frictions vanish, no low-valuation
agent owns an aircraft. Similarly, limγ′→+∞ µdo (a) converges to 0.Thus, the masses
∫ T
0
µlo (a) da
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and
∫ T
0
µdo (a) da—i.e., the masses of low-valuation agents and dealers with inventories—are
measures of assets inefficiently allocated in the economy. Based on the parameters estimated
from the data, in Section 7.1, I compute these measures to quantify the effects of trading
frictions on asset allocations.
6 Quantitative Analysis
The model does not admit an analytic solution for the asset allocations and asset prices as
a function of all the model primitives, except in the special case when assets are homogeneous—
i.e., ∂pi(z,a)
∂a
= 0; the Online Appendix reports this special case. Hence, the goal of the quan-
titative analysis is to choose the parameters that best match moments of the data with the
corresponding moments computed from the model’s numerical solution. Since the analytic
solution of the model under the assumption that ∂pi(z,a)
∂a
= 0 (presented in the Online Ap-
pendix) provides an approximation of the general model, it helps to build intuition for the
identification of some parameters.
6.1 Estimation
I estimate the model using the data on business aircraft described in Section 4, assuming
that they are generated from the model’s steady state. I set the unit of time to be one
quarter.
Unfortunately, the data lack some detailed information for identifying all parameters.
Therefore, I fix some values. Specifically, the discount rate ρ is traditionally difficult to
identify, and I fix it to ρ = .015. Moreover, since aircraft prices seem to reach the value of
zero at the age of 40, I fix the useful lifetime of an aircraft to be equal to T = 160 quarters.
I also fix the total mass of aircraft to be equal to the sample median A = 9, 687, and I
use a directory of aircraft dealers to calibrate total dealers’ capacity to equal µd = 1000.
Furthermore, I assume that aircraft owners’ flow payoff equals:
pi (z, a) = zδ1e
−δ2a, (17)
further imposing that δ1 = 1, as this parameter is not separately identified from the baseline
valuation zl (this is just a normalization).
I estimate the vector ψ = {λ, γs, γsd, αds, zh, zl, δ2, cs, θs, θd} composed of the exogenous
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parameters {λ, zh, zl, δ2, cs, θs, θd} and of the endogenous contact rates {γs, γsd, αds} using
a minimum-distance estimator that matches key moments of the model with their sample
analog. While γs, αds, γsd are endogenous rates, I can infer them directly from the data, and
this inference allows me to identify other primitives of the model, as I explain in more detail
in the next subsection.
For any value of the vector ψ, I solve the model of Section 5 to find agents’ and dealers’
policy functions and agents’ and dealers’ distributions {µho (a) , µlo (a) , µdo (a) , µhn, µln, µdn}
that are consistent with each other. Based on the model’s solution, I calculate the vector
m (ψ) composed of two sets of moments.
A. The first set, m1 (ψ) , includes moments based on transactions:
1. The fraction of aircraft for sale, which, in the model, equals:
∫ a∗
l
0
µlo (a) da+
∫ a∗
do
0
µdo (a) da
A
. (18)
2. The fraction of aircraft for sale by dealers (i.e., aggregate dealers’ inventories),
which equals: ∫ a∗
do
0
µdo (a) da
A
. (19)
3. The fraction of retail-to-retail transactions to total aircraft, which equals:
γs
∫ a∗
l
0
µlo (a) da
A
. (20)
4. The fraction of dealer-to-retail transactions to total aircraft, which equals:
αds
∫ a∗
do
0
µdo (a) da
A
. (21)
5. The average age of aircraft for sale, which equals:
∫ a∗
l
0
aµlo (a) da+
∫ a∗
do
0
aµdo (a) da∫ a∗
l
0
µlo (a) da+
∫ a∗
do
0
µdo (a) da
. (22)
B. The second set, m2 (ψ) , includes moments based on prices, obtained from the following
indirect inference procedure. Using the aircraft price data, I estimate via non-linear
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least squares the coefficients {β0; β1; β2; β3; β4; β5} of the following auxiliary equations:
p (a) = β0 + β1e
−β2a, (23)
pB (a) = β3 + β4e
−β5a. (24)
I simulate the model and use the simulated prices to estimate the corresponding co-
efficients
{
β0,sim; β1,sim; β2,sim; β3,sim; β4,sim; β5,sim
}
of equations (23) and (24). I then
match the vector of coefficients obtained from simulated prices and the one obtained
from the aircraft price data.
I follow Hansen (1982), who shows that the optimal (two-step) estimator takes the form
ψˆ = argmin
ψ∈Ψ
(m (ψ)−mS)
′Ω
(
ψ˜
)
(m (ψ)−mS) ,
where m (ψ) =
[
m1 (ψ)
m2 (ψ)
]
is the vector of moments computed from the model evaluated at
the parameter vector ψ; mS =
[
mS1
mS2
]
is the vector of corresponding sample moments; and
Ω
(
ψ˜
)
is a consistent estimate of the inverse of the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of
the moments, obtained using a preliminary consistent estimate ψ˜ of ψ. In practice, to have
a similar scale, I use moments in percentage deviation from their targets—i.e., m(ψ)−mS
mS
.
Moreover, in the first step, I use the identity matrix to weight the (rescaled) moments.
In the second step, since I combine two different datasets with two independent sampling
processes, I use a block-diagonal weighting matrix with two blocks, each containing the
inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of the moments
mi(ψ˜)−mSi
mSi
i = 1, 2, obtained using
the first-step consistent estimate ψ˜ to compute mi
(
ψ˜
)
and the corresponding dataset to
compute mSi.
6.2 Identification
The identification of the model shares several similarities with that of structural search
models of the labor market; see Eckstein and Van den Berg (2007). Specifically, although
the model is highly nonlinear, so that (almost) all parameters affect all outcomes, the iden-
tification of some parameters relies on some key moments in the data.
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The data on transactions identify the transition rates between states: λ, γs, αds, γsd.
The inference of the endogenous contact rates γs, αds, γsd allows me to identify the mass of
entrants µ and the efficiency parameters γ and γ′ of the matching functions. More precisely,
the fraction of aircraft for sale by owners that trades as retail-to-retail transactions identifies
the rate γs at which a seller meets a direct buyer. Similarly, the fraction of dealers’ inventories
that trades as dealer-to-retail transactions identifies the rate αds at which a dealer with
an aircraft to sell meets a buyer. Table 1 reports that dealers are faster than owners at
selling aircraft, and the model captures this difference through differences between their
corresponding trading rates αds and γs. Moreover, since owners wish to sell their assets
when their valuations drop, the fraction of aircraft for sale identifies the parameter λ that
governs these changes. Finally, aggregate dealers’ inventories identify the rate γsd at which
a seller meets a dealer willing to buy an aircraft.
The estimates of these rates λ, γs, γsd, αds, together with A, µd and the steady-state
condition µ
λ
= µhn +
∫ T
0
µho (a) da, allow me to recover the mass of entrants µ and the
efficiency parameters γ and γ′ of the matching functions by solving the differential equations
(14)-(16) that characterize the evolution of the endogenous distributions of agents µho (a) ,
µlo (a) and µdo (a) .
The data on prices, along with the average age of assets on the market—i.e., equation
(22)—jointly identify the remaining parameters: the aircraft depreciation δ2, the valuations
zh and zl, the bargaining parameters θs and θd, and the search cost cs. Specifically, the price
variation across vintages identifies the parameter δ2 that governs the depreciation of aircraft.
Moreover, Nash Bargaining implies that equilibrium prices depend on buyers’ outside
option, which is the value of continuing to search Shn. However, since buyers do not know
the age of the asset in their next meeting with a seller or a dealer, the value Shn does not vary
with the age of the asset traded and, thus, it affects the prices of all vintages—i.e., through
the intercepts β0 and β3 in the price equations (23) and (24). The value of searching Shn
obviously depends on buyers’ valuations zh and zl, as well as on their bargaining parameters:
It is negative if sellers and dealers leave no surplus to buyers—i.e., θs = θd = 1—and
increases with buyers’ bargaining powers 1 − θs and 1 − θd. Hence, the intercepts β0 and
β3 in equations (23) and (24) contribute to identifying the valuations and the bargaining
parameters. Similarly, the utility flow (17) and the negotiated prices (23) and (24) suggest
that the coefficients β1 and β4 also contribute to the identification of the valuations zh and
zl, and of the bargaining parameters θs and θd.
To further help explain the separate identification of bargaining parameters and valua-
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Fig. 1: This figure displays the results of numerical comparative statics of retail prices p(a) (solid
line) and wholesale prices pB(a) (dashed line) with respect to dealers’ bargaining parameter θd
and to agents’ valuation zh; the vertical dash-dot line corresponds to the estimated parameter,
reported in Table 2. The left panels display the prices of age-a = 0 aircraft, which correspond to
the parameters β0+β1 in equation (23) and β3+β4 in equation (24), respectively; the right panels
display the intercepts β0 and β3. All other parameters are fixed at their calibrated/estimated value.
tions, Figure 1 displays the numerical comparative statics of retail (solid line) and wholesale
prices (dashed line) with respect to dealers’ bargaining parameter θd (first row) and to agents’
valuation zh/zl (second row), in the neighborhood of the estimated parameters (the vertical
dotted line): the left panels display the prices of age-a = 0 aircraft, which correspond to the
parameters β0 + β1 in equation (23) and β3 + β4 in equation (24), respectively; the right
panels display the intercepts β0 and β3. These panels show that bargaining parameters and
valuations have a differential effect on prices. Most notably, both top panels show that deal-
ers’ bargaining parameter has a greater effect on wholesale prices than on retail prices, and
the right panel indicates that the ranking of the intercepts rules out certain combinations
of bargaining parameters {θs, θd}. Hence, these panels suggest that the differences between
retail and wholesale prices identify the bargaining parameters—i.e., the differences between
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the intercepts β0−β3 and between the coefficients β1−β4—whereas the level of these prices
identifies the valuations.12
Furthermore, the average age of assets on the market is a decreasing function of the search
cost cs. When deciding whether or not to put the asset on the market, sellers anticipate that
they have to pay the flow cost cs while searching for a counterparty. This cost is sunk at
the time of the negotiation, but ex-ante, when deciding whether to put their assets on the
market, sellers will be unwilling to do so if the search cost cs is large. As this cost decreases,
sellers will be more willing to put their assets on the market, but only if it makes sense from
an ex-ante point of view. Since the gains from trade are larger for younger assets, sellers are
more likely to sell older aircraft if search costs are low. Thus, the average age of assets on
the market is informative about cs.
Finally, the free-entry condition Jdn = 0 implies that I can recover dealers’ fixed costs k
from dealers’ bid-ask spread and their trading rates.
6.3 Estimates
Table 2 reports estimates of the parameters and of the contact rates γs, αds, and γsd. The
top part of the table reports the parameters and contact rates that are estimated directly,
while the bottom part reports the parameters µ, γ, γ′, and k that are derived from the
estimated contact rates γs, αds, and γsd. I calculate asymptotic standard errors for the
direct estimates and 95-percent confidence intervals obtained by bootstrapping the data
for the parameters µ, γ, γ′, and k. As a compromise between accuracy and computation
burden, I use 100 replications. Appendix B provides more detail about the computation of
the standard errors and the bootstrap simulations.
The magnitude of the parameter λ indicates that, on average, valuations switch from high
to low approximately every five years. The magnitude of the sum γs + γsd indicates that
an aircraft stays on the market approximately eight months before a low-valuation owner
is able to sell it. The magnitude of the parameter αds indicates that, on average, it takes
slightly more than four months for a dealer to find a buyer. On average, each dealer trades
12To my knowledge, this identification of the bargaining parameters is novel in the literature. A few
recent papers in the labor-search literature estimate workers’ and firms’ bargaining parameters; see Cahuc,
Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006) and Flinn (2006). Those papers use additional information on labor demand
or on firms’ production function, together with observed wages, to infer workers’ bargaining parameter. In
the current setting, it would correspond to having additional information on aircraft demand that could be
used to infer agents’ valuations zh and zl. Instead, in the absence of this information, I identify the bargaining
parameters by exploiting the difference between retail and dealer prices, and the vertical heterogeneity of
the assets.
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Table 2: Estimates
λ
0.0457
(0.0035)
zh
695, 610
(41, 258)
γs
0.1825
(0.0015)
zl
114, 060
(16, 250)
γsd
0.1737
(0.0447)
cs
1, 622.7
(486.23)
αds
0.7021
(0.0054)
θs
0.3925
(0.0923)
δ2
0.0167(
0.1346 ∗ 10−3
) θd 0.9732
(0.0054)
γ
5.9717 ∗ 10−5
[3.823; 6.225] ∗ 10−5
µ
482.3
[475.7; 733.0]
γ′
2.2973 ∗ 10−4
[1.444; 2.333] ∗ 10−4
k
244, 767
[232, 810; 303, 120]
Notes—This table reports the estimates of the parameters. Asymptotic standard errors, in paren-
theses. 95-percent confidence intervals in brackets are obtained by bootstrapping the data using
100 replications.
one aircraft every 1∫ a∗
do
0
αdb(a)da
+ 1
αds
' 6 quarters. These parameters, γs, γsd and αds, imply
that trading delays are non-trivial in this market and that dealers play an important role in
reducing them: their pairwise-meeting rate γ′ is almost four times the agents’ direct meeting
rate γ.
The parameter δ2 indicates that business aircraft depreciate by approximately seven
percent every year, a decline comparable to that of larger commercial aircraft. The valuations
zh and zl indicate that the difference between buyers’ and sellers’ valuations are large—
i.e., gains from trade are large. The parameter cs indicates that the flow search costs are
small, implying that the average search costs of completing a transaction cs
γs+γsd
are trivial:
approximately $5,000.
The bargaining parameter θs implies that buyers and sellers split the surplus almost
equally, with buyers capturing a slightly large share. Dealers’ bargaining parameter θd, how-
ever, implies that they capture almost all the surplus of their transactions. The difference
between these bargaining parameters is, perhaps, suggestive of the fact that intermediaries,
who trade frequently, are more sophisticated in negotiations than agents, who trade occa-
sionally (Green, Hollifield, and Schu¨rhoff, 2007a,b). In turn, free entry implies that the costs
of “market-making” are large, and Table 2 reports that dealers’ costs k equal $244, 767 per
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quarter.
6.4 Model Fit
Before considering some broader implications of our results, I examine the fit of the es-
timated model. Table 3 contains the moments calculated from the data, as well as from the
numerical solutions of the model. To appreciate how different weighting of the moments af-
fects the estimation, I report the numerical values of the moments calculated from the model
using the first-step parameters in column (4) and the second-step parameters in column (5).
Overall, Table 3 reports that the model evaluated at the first-step parameters matches
the data quite precisely, with an average absolute percentage deviation between the empir-
ical moments and the simulated moments of 3.8 percent. The weighting of the moments in
the second step pushes the estimation to match the price moments more precisely than the
transaction moments, since they have a relatively lower variance. The average absolute per-
centage deviation between the actual and simulated data slightly increases as a consequence
of the differential weighting.
Nonetheless, the number of moments is larger than the number of estimated parameters—
they equal 11 and 10, respectively; thus, I can test the over-identifying restriction by con-
structing the J-statistic, which is asymptotically distributed as a χ2 with one degree of
freedom under the null hypothesis that m(ψˆ) −mS = 0. With the value of the J-statistic
being 2.9, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the over-identifying restriction holds at
the standard 95-percent confidence level, thus indicating that the fit of the estimated model
is quite good.
To further demonstrate how the model fits the price data in a, perhaps, more-intuitive
way, Figure 2 displays the empirical average retail prices by vintage, along with their theo-
retical counterparts p (a) , showing that the model fits them well. Similarly, the theoretical
dealers’ bid prices pB (a) fit the empirical average wholesale prices almost perfectly.
13 Section
6.2 argued that prices play a key role in the identification of the bargaining parameters, and
Section 7 will show that the bargaining parameters play a key role in the welfare results of
the counterfactual analyses; thus, it is instructive that the empirical and theoretical prices
are almost identical. Of course, the model focuses on a market with homogeneous assets in
steady state, whereas the price data exhibit both cross-sectional variability across heteroge-
13The estimates imply that dealers’ ask prices pA (a) are approximately 30-percent larger than pB (a).
Unfortunately, the aircraft prices dataset does not report their empirical analog.
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Table 3: Model Fit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Empirical Moment Empirical Value Theoretical Moment
Simulated Value
First Step
Simulated Value
Second Step
E
(
Aircraft for Sale
Active Aircraft
)
0.1223
∫ a∗
l
0
µ
lo
(a)da+
∫ a∗
do
0
µ
do
(a)da
A
0.1266 0.1324
E
(
Aircraft for Sale by Dealers
Active Aircraft
)
0.0357
∫ a∗
do
0
µ
do
(a)da
A
0.0362 0.0264
E
(
Retail-to-Retail Transactions
Active Aircraft
)
0.0196
γ
s
∫ a∗
l
0
µ
lo
(a)da
A
0.0188 0.0193
E
(
Dealer-to-Retail Transactions
Active Aircraft
)
0.0279
αds
∫ a∗
do
0
µ
do
(a)da
A
0.0268 0.0186
E (Average Age, Aircraft for Sale) 57.2148
∫ a∗
l
0
aµ
lo
(a)da+
∫ a∗
do
0
aµ
do
(a)da
∫ a∗
l
0
µ
lo
(a)da+
∫ a∗
do
0
µ
do
(a)da
61.3937 76.0232
β0 + β1 17, 656, 300 β0,sim + β1,sim 17, 051, 000 17, 549, 000
β1 19, 414, 500 β1,sim 18, 213, 600 19, 499, 000
β2 0.0161 β2,sim 0.0160 0.0158
β3 + β4 15, 593, 700 β3,sim + β4,sim 16, 636, 000 15, 579, 000
β4 17, 281, 400 β4,sim 17, 853, 200 17, 469, 000
β5 0.0159 β5,sim 0.0162 0.0157
Notes—This table reports the values of the empirical moments and of the simulated moments calculated at the estimated parameters.
Column (4) reports the simulated moments calculated using the first-step estimates (not reported), and column (5) reports the
simulated moments calculated using the second-step estimates reported in Table 2. The coefficients β0, β1 and β2 are obtained from
a non-linear least squares regression using Retail Prices; the coefficients β3, β4 and β5 are obtained from a non-linear least squares
regression using Wholesale Prices; the coefficients β0,sim, β1,sim and β2,sim are obtained from a non-linear least squares regression
using simulated retail-to-retail prices p (a); the coefficients β3,sim, β4,sim and β5,sim are obtained from a non-linear least squares
regression using simulated retail-to-dealer prices pB (a).
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Fig. 2: Model fit: average retail prices in the data (dashed line) and prices in the model (solid
line) as a function of aircraft age.
neous aircraft and time-series variability due to business cycles. Thus, the empirical average
prices by vintage, displayed in Figure 2, remove the cross-sectional and time-series variabil-
ity. Other measures of fit, such as the R2 of the non-linear least squares regressions (24),
preserve the variability in the data and, indeed, exhibit larger differences between actual and
simulated price data: they equal 0.31 and 1, respectively.
7 Counterfactual Analyses
I now perform two counterfactuals to answer the questions of how frictions and dealers
affect asset allocations, prices and welfare. In both cases, I compute the equilibrium in these
counterfactual scenarios using the parameter estimates reported in Table 2.
7.1 Quantifying the Effects of Frictions
The estimates of the parameters allow me to quantify the effect of trading frictions on
the allocation and the prices of assets, as well as on welfare. Specifically, I compare asset
allocations, asset prices and welfare with the Walrasian efficient benchmark, which is a
special case of the model presented in Section 5 when trade is frictionless—i.e., γ → +∞
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and cs = 0.
In the Walrasian market, as soon as high-valuation agents enter the market, they immedi-
ately meet low-valuation sellers or dealers. Hence, in a frictionless market, no low-valuation
agents and no dealers have aircraft—i.e., µwlo (a) = µ
w
do (a) = 0 for any a. Thus, the sum∫ T
0
(µlo (a) + µdo (a)) da measures the total mass of assets misallocated due to search fric-
tions. Of these misallocated assets, the mass
∫ a∗
l
0
µlo (a) da+
∫ a∗
do
0
µdo (a) da is on the market
for sale, and the mass
∫ T
0
(µlo (a) + µdo (a)) da−
∫ a∗
l
0
µlo (a) da−
∫ a∗
do
0
µdo (a) da =
∫ T
a∗
l
µlo (a) da
corresponds to the mass of aircraft older than a∗l that low-valuation owners are keeping rather
than selling since sellers’ expected surplus is lower than their transaction costs.14
Walrasian prices are equal to:
pw (a) =
∫ T
a
e−ρ(t−a)zhe
−δ2tdt
=
zhe
ρa
ρ+ δ2
(
e−a(δ2+ρ) − e−T (δ2+ρ)
)
.
Instead, in the estimated model with frictions, prices are equal to p (a) = (1− θs) (Slo (a)− Vln)+
θs (Uho (a)− Shn), as in equation (11).
The top parts of columns (1) and (2) in Table 4 report the calculations of these magnitudes
for the model and the Walrasian benchmark, respectively. The first row reports that trading
frictions cause the misallocation of 1,681 aircraft, corresponding to 18.3 percent of all aircraft.
The third row reports that 1,215 aircraft are on the market for sale, whereas for the remaining
1, 681−1, 215 = 466 aircraft, the trading costs of selling them are larger the sellers’ expected
gains from trade; thus, these aircraft are not even on the market for sale. Table 4 further
shows that trading frictions decrease the price of new aircraft by p(0)−p
w(0)
pw(0)
= −19.26 percent
(corresponding to $4, 201, 000) relative to the Walrasian benchmark. The percent decrease
of a ten-year-old aircraft is similar.
The bottom part of Table 4 calculates welfare in the estimated model and in the Wal-
rasian market, decomposing it into three components: allocations, search costs and dealers’
costs. Hence, the differences in these components between the estimated model and the Wal-
rasian market account for the welfare effects of trading frictions, with key model parameters
affecting each of them. Specifically:
1. Allocations.
14The estimates imply that the age cutoff a∗l equals 138 quarters, whereas dealers’ age cutoff a
∗
do equals
125 quarters.
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Table 4: Comparison with Walrasian Market
(1) (2) (3)
Estimated Model Walrasian Market cs = 0∫ T
0 (µlo (a) + µdo (a)) da
1, 681
[1, 646; 2, 399]
0
[0; 0]
1, 698
[1, 683; 2, 480]
∫
T
0
(µlo(a)+µdo(a))da
A
0.183
[0.179; 0.256]
0
[0; 0]
0.183
[0.182; 0.264]∫ a∗
l
0 µlo (a) da+
∫ a∗
do
0 µdo (a) da
1, 215
[1, 202; 1, 755]
0
[0; 0]
1, 218
[1, 152; 1, 742]
∫ a∗
l
0
µlo(a)da+
∫ a∗
do
0
µdo(a)da
A
0.132
[0.130; 0.187]
0
[0; 0]
0.132
[0.125; 0.184]
p (0)
17, 611, 151
[17, 253; 17, 969] ∗ 103
21, 812, 709
[21, 532; 22, 145] ∗ 103
17, 648, 470
[17, 249; 18, 097] ∗ 103
p (10)
8, 437, 910
[8, 366; 8, 531] ∗ 103
11, 008, 194
[10, 633; 11, 221] ∗ 103
8, 475, 461
[8, 148; 8, 672] ∗ 103
Allocations
2.054 ∗ 109
[1.942; 2.060] ∗ 109
2.371 ∗ 109
[2.324; 2.397] ∗ 103
2.057 ∗ 109
[1.941; 2.062] ∗ 103
Search Costs
6.534 ∗ 106
[4.817; 14.182] ∗ 106
0
[0; 0]
0
[0; 0]
Dealers Costs
244 ∗ 106
[232.8; 303.1] ∗ 106
0
[0; 0]
255 ∗ 106
[206.5; 311.6] ∗ 106
Welfare
1.802 ∗ 109
[1.614; 1.803] ∗ 109
2.371 ∗ 109
[2.324; 2.397] ∗ 103
1.801 ∗ 109
[1.632; 1.828] ∗ 103
Notes—This table reports counterfactual allocations and prices. 95-percent confidence intervals in
brackets are obtained by bootstrapping the data using 100 replications.
These equal the equilibrium utility flows:
∫ T
0
(µho (a) zh + µlo (a) zl) e
−δ2ada in the es-
timated model and xT
∫ T
0
zhe
−δ2ada in the Walrasian market.
Hence, this component of the aggregate welfare costs is determined by: a) the mass
of misallocated assets. In turn, these depend on the trading delays, captured by the
contact rates γs, γsd and αds; and on how frequently agents seek to trade, captured
by the parameter λ. b) the difference between the utility flows of buyers, sellers and
dealers. These flows depend on their valuations zh, zl and 0, respectively, and on the
age of the asset through e−δ2a.
At the estimated parameters, the welfare loss equals $317, 220, 000 per quarter, or 13.38
percent of the total potential welfare xT
∫ T
0
zhe
−δ2ada of the Walrasian market.
2. Buyers’ and sellers’ search costs.
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These equal the costs that buyers and sellers incur while searching for a counterparty
in the estimated model, and they correspond to cs
(∫ a∗
h
0
µlo (a) da+ µhn
)
. They equal
zero in the Walrasian market.
Hence, this component of the aggregate welfare costs depends on the search cost cs
and on the masses of agents that seek to trade—which, again, depend on the trading
delays (captured by the contact rates γs, γsd and αds) and on how frequently agents
seek to trade (captured by the parameter λ).
At the estimated parameters, this welfare loss equals $6, 534, 000 per quarter, or 0.28
percent of total potential welfare of the Walrasian market.
3. Dealers’ costs.
These equal the costs that dealers incur to provide intermediation, and they correspond
to kµd in the estimated model. They are equal to zero in the Walrasian market.
Hence, this component of the aggregate welfare costs is determined by dealers’ ag-
gregate capacity µd and by dealers’ costs k. In a free-entry equilibrium, dealers’ costs
depend on their bid-ask spread, which, in turn, depends on their bargaining parameter
θd.
At the estimated parameters, this welfare loss equals $244, 770, 000 per quarter, or
10.32 percent of total potential welfare of the Walrasian market.
Overall, the aggregate welfare loss due to trading frictions equals $568, 520, 000 per quar-
ter, or 23.98 percent of welfare in the Walrasian market.
Two frictions affect allocations, prices and welfare in the estimated model relative to the
Walrasian market: trading delays and search costs. We can assess the relative contribution of
search costs by computing the equilibrium when cs = 0; column (3) in Table 4 reports these
calculations. In general, the elimination of search costs directly affects parties’ outside op-
tions in bargaining, thereby changing agents’ policies and the negotiated prices. In addition,
this reduction in search costs affects dealers’ margins. Thus, dealers’ free-entry condition
implies that their mass changes, as well. Since dealers’ mass determines agents’ buying and
selling rates, the elimination of search costs has general-equilibrium effects on allocations,
further affecting equilibrium prices. In the specific case reported in Table 4, dealers’ margins
increase, thereby increasing their mass µd and their aggregate inventories. Overall, column
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Fig. 3: Actual prices (solid line), Walrasian prices (dashed line) and prices without search costs
(dash-dotted line) as a function of aircraft age.
(3) says that the mass of misallocated aircraft increases and that asset prices increase when
cs = 0.
The bottom part of column (3) calculates welfare, also decomposing it into its different
components. It shows that aggregate welfare decreases relative to the case in which search
costs are positive, indicating that inefficiencies may increase when search costs vanish—i.e.,
in contrast to the findings of a large search literature. The reason is that more dealers enter
the market, but since they mainly appropriate surplus that other agents and other dealers
would create, the private benefits of new entrants outweigh the social benefits (Von Weiz-
sacker, 1980; Mankiw and Whinston, 1986). However, the magnitude of this welfare decrease
is small, as the search costs are small.
Figure 3 plots the estimated and counterfactual prices, confirming that actual prices (the
solid line) are always lower than Walrasian prices (the dashed line) and prices without search
costs (the dash-dotted line). Moreover, the figure displays an additional interesting pattern:
Walrasian prices decline at a faster rate than actual prices. The reason is that the willingness
to pay for a marginally younger—i.e., better—aircraft is higher if there are no frictions.
Overall, these counterfactuals imply non-trivial effects on allocations, prices and welfare,
clearly illustrating the importance of frictions in this decentralized market.
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7.2 Quantifying the Effects of Dealers
The estimates of the parameters allow me to quantify the effects of dealers on asset
allocation, asset prices and welfare. Specifically, I compare asset allocations and asset prices
with the counterfactual of no dealers—i.e., γ′ = 0 or k → +∞—and then compare aggregate
welfare and its components: allocations, search costs and dealers’ costs.
If dealers are not active, buyers’ and sellers’ meeting rates change, thus changing their
distributions over the states. Specifically, the distributions of agents evolve according to:
µ˙ho (a) = γb (a)µhn − λµho (a) for a < a
∗∗
ho,
µ˙lo (a) = λ1 (a < a
∗∗
ho)µho (a)− γs1 (a < a
∗∗
l )µlo (a) for a < T,
µ˙hn = (µ− x) + µho (a
∗∗
ho)− λµhn − µhn
∫ a∗∗
l
0
γb (a) da,
with initial conditions µho (0) = x and µlo (0) = 0 and terminal conditions µho (a) = 0 for
a∗∗ho < a < T. Similarly, at each instant, the mass of ln-agents equals:
µln = λµhn + γs
∫ a∗∗
l
0
µlo (a) da+ µlo (T ) .
The cutoff ages a∗∗ho and a
∗∗
l may differ from a
∗
h and a
∗
l , defined in Section 5.2.4, as agents’
value functions and policies depend on whether or not dealers are active. Moreover, the coun-
terfactual steady-state distributions of agents have to be consistent with the counterfactual
trading probabilities γb (a) and γs, which are also key components of the counterfactual
prices.
Table 5 reports the calculations of these magnitudes for the model and the counterfactual
market with no dealers, and Figure 4 plots the prices. The table and the figure show
interesting features. The first row of the table reports that the number of misallocated assets
increases to 2, 013 units, or 20.6 percent of all aircraft. This 2.3-percentage-point increase in
misallocated assets corresponds to a 12.5-percent increase in misallocated assets relative to
the estimated model. The third row reports that 2, 000 of these 2, 013 misallocated aircraft
would be for sale in a market without dealers. This mass is larger than in the estimated
model for two reasons: 1) the longer trading delays increase the mass of assets on the
market for a given volume of trade; and 2) low-valuation owners are more likely to sell their
older assets—i.e., their cutoff increases: a∗∗l > a
∗
l—since they capture a greater share of the
surplus: sellers’ bargaining power is now always equal to θs = .3756, whereas it was equal
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Table 5: Comparison with a Market with No Dealers
Estimated Model No Dealer Market∫ T
0
µlo (a) da+
∫ a∗
do
0
µdo (a) da
1, 681
[1, 646; 2, 399]
2, 013
[1, 979; 2, 634]
∫
T
0
µlo(a)da+
∫ a∗
do
0
µdo(a)da
A
0.183
[0.179; 0.256]
0.206
[0.203; 0.270]∫ a∗
l
0
µlo (a) da+
∫ a∗
do
0
µdo (a) da
1, 215
[1, 202; 1, 755]
2, 000
[1, 979; 2, 616]
∫ a∗
l
0
µlo(a)da+
∫ a∗
do
0
µdo(a)da
A
0.132
[0.130; 0.187]
0.205
[0.203; 0.268]
p (0)
17, 611, 151
[17, 253; 17, 969] ∗ 103
18, 118, 803
[17, 791; 18, 738] ∗ 103
p (10)
8, 437, 910
[8, 366; 8, 531] ∗ 103
9, 086, 250
[8, 836; 9, 295] ∗ 103
Allocations
2.054 ∗ 109
[1.942; 2.060] ∗ 109
1.984 ∗ 109
[1.859; 1.990] ∗ 109
Search Costs
6.534 ∗ 106
[4.817; 14.182] ∗ 106
7.817 ∗ 106
[5.631; 16.368] ∗ 106
Dealers Costs
244 ∗ 106
[232.8; 303.1] ∗ 106
0
[0; 0]
Welfare
1.802 ∗ 109
[1.614; 1.803] ∗ 109
1.977 ∗ 109
[1.844; 1.983] ∗ 109
Notes—This table reports counterfactual allocations and prices in a market without dealers. 95-
percent confidence intervals in brackets are obtained by bootstrapping the data using 100 replica-
tions.
to 1− θd = 1− .9732 = .0268 when they sold to a dealer. This second effect dominates the
opposing effect that total search costs are greater because delays are longer, since the flow
search cost cs is small.
The bottom part of Table 5 calculates the different components of welfare in the counter-
factual market with no dealers—i.e., allocations, search costs and dealers costs—and, thus,
the differences of these components between the estimated model and the counterfactual
market account for the welfare effects of dealers. Specifically:
1. Allocations.
At the estimated parameters, dealers improve the allocation, and this welfare gain
equals $69, 261, 000 per quarter, corresponding to 3.84 percent of aggregate welfare of
the estimated model.
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Fig. 4: Actual (solid line) and counterfactual (dashed line) aircraft prices if there were no dealers
as a function of aircraft age.
2. Buyers’ and sellers’ search costs.
With dealers, agents trade faster, incurring lower cumulative search costs. The welfare
gain due to lower agents’ search costs equals $1, 282, 600 per quarter, corresponding to
0.07 percent of aggregate welfare of the estimated model.
3. Dealers’ costs.
Dealers’ costs to provide intermediation equal kµd. Using the estimated parameters,
the welfare loss due to dealers’ costs equals $244, 443, 693 per quarter, corresponding
to 13.57 percent of aggregate welfare of the estimated model.
The net effect of dealers is a welfare loss of $174, 220, 000 per quarter, or 9.66 percent of
aggregate welfare of the estimated model. The reason for this result is that, while dealers
improve the allocation of assets, they impose a negative externality on agents by lowering
their direct meeting rates and, thus, appropriate surplus that agents would create. Moreover,
since dealers appropriate almost all the transaction surplus, many enter to capture arbitrage
profits, but these profits are competed away in a market with free entry (Von Weizsacker,
1980; Mankiw and Whinston, 1986). Hence, dealers’ aggregate costs outweigh the social
benefits that they generate in terms of a more efficient asset allocation.
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Table 5 also shows that prices of new aircraft increase by approximately $500, 000, a 2.88-
percent increase. The reason for this increase is that, without dealers, the volume of trade
is lower. Therefore, at any point in time, the mass of high-valuation agents seeking to buy
an aircraft is larger—i.e., µndhn > µhn. Hence, it is easier for sellers to find a high-valuation
buyer—i.e., γnds > γs—thereby increasing their value function Vlo (a) and their outside option
in bargaining. This effect dominates the opposite effects of higher search costs and slower
trade on asset prices.
7.3 Sensitivity Analysis
The main result reported in Table 5 is, perhaps, striking: that is, at the estimated param-
eter values, dealers decrease aggregate welfare. Hence, I now perform additional analyses to
investigate the ranges of the parameters for which this result holds. In turn, these analyses
should shed further light on the key mechanism behind the result, as well as on the empirical
moments that underpin it.
Figure 5 displays the results of numerical comparative statics with respect to key pa-
rameters of the model. Each row displays equilibrium outcomes of a numerical solution of
the model in which one parameter differs from its estimated value, while all other param-
eters are fixed at their calibrated/estimated values. For example, the plots of the first row
obtain as the valuation zh varies from its lower bound zl to un upper bound of 20zl; the
vertical dashed line indicates the estimated value of the parameter. All other parameters
{ρ, T, A, , zl, δ2, γ, γ
′, λ, µ, θs, θd, cs, k} are kept at their calibrated/estimated values. Using
these parameters, I compute the numerical solution of the model by imposing dealers’ free-
entry condition Jdn = 0, which results in a different value of the mass of dealers µd, displayed
in the left column. I further compute the resulting welfare, as well as the welfare in the mar-
ket with no dealers (i.e., following the same calculations reported in Section 7.2) at these
parameters, and the right column displays their ratio.
The figure shows several interesting findings. First, the main result, that dealers decrease
welfare, appears very robust to individual changes in parameter values: a different value of
the high-valuation zh, of the switching rate λ, of dealers’ bargaining power θd, of agents’
search cost cs, and of dealers’ cost k does not bring about a welfare increase. Welfare
increases exclusively when the ratio of meeting rates γ
′
γ
—i.e., a ratio that captures dealers’
trading efficiency relative to agents’—exceeds the value of 94, which is approximately 25
times larger than its estimated value of 3.8. Second, for several values of the parameters,
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Fig. 5: This figure displays the results of comparative statics with respect to key parameters. Each row
displays the equilibrium mass of dealers (left column), as well as the corresponding welfare relative to the
market with no dealers (right column), obtained from a numerical solution of the model. The vertical dash-
dot line displays the estimated value of the parameter that varies in in each plot. All other parameters are
fixed at their calibrated/estimated value.
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dealers do not enter, as their costs k are larger than the revenues that they can earn; thus,
aggregate welfare equals the value of aggregate welfare in a market with no dealers. More
specifically, if the valuation zh (which captures the gain from trade) is sufficiently low, or
the switching rate λ (which captures the frequency of trade) is sufficiently low, or dealers’
bargaining power θd is sufficiently low, or dealers’ costs k are sufficiently high, then no dealer
enters the market. Third, when dealers enter, welfare is lower than in the market with no
dealers, but welfare does not necessarily decrease as more dealers enter: for example, the
left panel in the bottom row of Figure 5 shows that dealers’ mass is a monotonic function
of their cost k, whereas the right panel shows that welfare is a non-monotonic function of
dealers’ costs. In practice, these patterns imply that welfare would decrease for a large range
of lower costs than those reported in Table 2.
More generally, these comparative statics highlight that the model allows intermediaries
to increase or decrease welfare, depending on parameters. Dealers’ entry generates a trade-off
for aggregate efficiency. The aggregate benefits are the improvement in asset allocations and
the reduction in cumulative search costs; both benefits increase as the difference between the
meeting rates γ′ − γ becomes larger. The aggregate costs are dealers’ costs kµd, which, in a
free-entry equilibrium, equal their revenues and, thus, depend on the share θd of the surplus
that they capture.
Figure 6 focuses on this trade-off. Specifically, it displays the numerical results of ad-
ditional comparative statics in which I simultaneously vary the benefits due to dealers,
measured by the ratio γ
′
γ
, and their costs, measured by their bargaining power θd.
Figure 6 clearly identifies three separate regions: 1) dealers do not enter, if their bar-
gaining power is so low that they cannot recoup their costs; 2) dealers enter and decrease
welfare, if their relative trading efficiency is not large, but they capture a large share of
aggregate surplus (which is competed away in a free-entry equilibrium); and 3) dealers enter
and increase welfare, if their relative trading efficiency is large and they do not capture all
transaction surplus.
While Figure 6 highlights that intermediaries’ welfare effects are ambiguous in the model,
the star in the bottom-right corner of Figure 6 shows that the estimated parameters are un-
ambiguously in the region in which dealers decrease welfare. It is important to remember
which features of the data determine these estimates. The estimates of the trading efficiency
parameters γ′ and γ obtain from the relative trading speed of dealers and agents: the trans-
action data in Table 1 indicate that dealers’ inventories stay on the market for approximately
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Fig. 6: The figure displays the combinations of the ratio between the pairwise meeting rates γ′/γ
and of dealers’ bargaining parameter θd for which dealers do not enter (white area); dealers enter
and increase welfare (light-shaded area); dealers enter and decrease welfare (dark-shaded area).
The star corresponds to values of the estimated parameters.
four months, whereas agents’ assets stay on the market for about eight months; thus, deal-
ers, indeed, meet counterparties at a faster rate than agents, but their relative efficiency is
limited. The bargaining power obtains from the price data, most notably from the large
difference between Retail Price and Wholesale Price reported in Table 1. Together,
these different data suggest that dealers extract a larger share of the surplus than the social
benefits that they generate; however, dealers’ private benefits are competed away in a market
with free entry and, thus, welfare decreases (Mankiw and Whinston, 1986).
Overall, these data on asset trades and on asset prices, along with the numerical results
reported in Figures 5 and 6, seem to refute the main factors that could adversely affect the
finding that dealers decrease welfare—i.e., a greater efficiency or a smaller bargaining power
of dealers.
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8 Concluding Remarks
This paper provides a framework for empirically analyzing decentralized asset markets. I
use this framework to investigate the effects of trading frictions and of intermediaries on asset
allocations, asset prices and welfare in the business-aircraft market. The model fits the data
well. The estimates imply that trading frictions generate moderate allocative inefficiencies in
such markets: Compared to the Walrasian benchmark, 18.3 percent of all business aircraft are
misallocated, and aircraft prices are 19.2-percent lower. Moreover, dealers play an important
role in reducing frictions: In a market with no dealers, 20.6 percent of the assets would be
misallocated, and prices would increase by 2.88 percent. However, the net effect of dealers
is a welfare loss equal to 9.66 percent of aggregate welfare of the estimated model. This
is because dealers impose a negative externality by decreasing agents’ direct transactions,
and the estimate of dealers’ bargaining power implies that they appropriate almost all gains
from trade. Thus, many dealers enter to capture these arbitrage profits, but their profits are
competed away in a market with free entry.
While these empirical results complement those of other papers that, in different settings,
find that intermediaries’ entry may be excessive from a welfare point of view (e.g., Hsieh
and Moretti, 2003; Budish, Cramton, and Shim, 2014; Leslie and Sorensen, 2014; Pagnotta
and Philippon, 2011), they obtain in a model with some important limitations. First, the
supply x of new assets is exogenous. This modeling assumption is common in many other
models that focus on secondary markets and on trading frictions. Second, information on
buyers is unavailable: The mass of new buyers µ is exogenous, and their meeting rates are
derived from the model. Hence, the identification of trading frictions relies exclusively on
the sellers’ side of the market. Many equilibrium search models share this feature, and
one objective of this paper is to show that, under the same assumptions, it is possible to
quantify the effect of trading delays on allocations, prices and welfare. Third, there are no
aggregate shocks. In reality, the business-aircraft market, like most other asset markets,
exhibits fluctuations in prices and trading volume, corresponding to fluctuations in supply
and demand. The key advantage of a stationary framework is that the numerical solution of
the model is quite fast to compute, thereby facilitating the estimation and the counterfactual
analyses. Nonetheless, a potential concern is how sensitive the estimation results are to this
stationarity assumption. The fact that the estimates of the parameters are quite precise (the
standard errors are small; see Section 6.3) may suggest that aggregate shocks do not greatly
affect the empirical moments and, thus, the results. Fourth, price is the only characteristic
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over which parties bargain, and no other characteristics, such as financing, are taken into
consideration.
Finally, the model allows for parsimonious heterogeneity among agents and among deal-
ers. As explained in Section 4, the aggregate nature of the data makes a model with richer
heterogeneity difficult to identify. One important consequence of agents’ limited heterogene-
ity is that the model focuses on negative shocks to valuations as the motive for selling assets,
and agents replace their aircraft only when they reach the scrappage age. Similarly, dealers’
limited heterogeneity contributes to the close substitutability of all transactions. Hence,
while providing immediacy to agents, dealers simultaneously impose a negative externality
on them by lowering their direct meeting rates, and this accounts, in part, for the negative
welfare effects of dealers’ free entry.
For these main reasons, I view this paper as a first step in quantifying the role of trading
frictions and of intermediaries in asset markets. The empirical application clarifies the data
requirements to estimate such a model and how the parameters are identified, and the
estimation delivers a sense of the magnitudes involved, allowing me to assess which forces
dominate and their welfare effects. Nonetheless, I hope that the future availability of richer
data will allow me to incorporate additional features of these markets and, most notably, to
study the role of intermediaries in greater detail.
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APPENDICES
A Motives for Trade
The goal of this Appendix is to document patterns of trade in the data. These patterns are
inconsistent with the idea that most secondary-market transactions are due to replacements
of depreciated units with higher-quality ones. Instead, they favor the idea that the main
motive for trade in the secondary market is the change in owners’ valuations of the assets.
More specifically, Hendel and Lizzeri (1999), Porter and Sattler (1999), and Stolyarov
(2002) develop models in which agents with heterogeneous willingness-to-pay for vertically-
differentiated vintages wish to replace their durables after they depreciate, but transaction
costs are an impediment to instantaneous trade. In these models, a faster rate of deprecia-
tion increases the vertical differentiation between vintages, thereby leading to more-frequent
replacements. Thus, these theoretical arguments lead to the following implications:
1. Assets with faster depreciation should have higher resale rates.
To investigate whether the data are consistent with this prediction, I proceed in two
steps: 1) I obtain an annual Depreciation Rate of each aircraft-model i in year t
in the data by fitting the following regression on the different vintages a within model
i in year t:
log p (a) = ϕ0it + ϕ1ita, (25)
where p (a) is the Retail Price of the vintage-a aircraft. The absolute value of ϕ1it
(note that it is negative) is the estimate of the Depreciation Rate.
2) I construct the variable Volume of Trade of aircraft-model i and year t as
the ratio Total Number of Transactions
Active Aircraft
and investigate whether it is correlated with the
Depreciation Rate.
Table 6 reports the results of several specifications. Columns (1)-(4) report coefficients
of OLS regressions that pool all model-year pairs; columns (5)-(8) report coefficients
of random-effects panel regressions; and columns (9)-(12) report coefficients of fixed-
effects panel regressions. The Depreciation Rate has no significant effect on the
Volume of Trade in any of the specifications (1)-(12), suggesting that replacement
is not the main motive for trade.
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Table 6: The Effect of Depreciation on Volume of Trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Depreciation Rate
.0492
(.1758)
.1532
(.1887)
.0659
(.1784)
.1733
(.1965)
−.2453
(.1420)
−.0058
(.1458)
−.1800
(.1310)
.0243
(.1462)
−.2867
(.1534)
−.0843
(.1372)
−.2043
(.1380)
−.0173
(.1324)
Log(Active Aircraft)
.0087
(.0044)
.0094
(.0044)
.0274
(.0038)
.0206
(.0046)
.0355
(.0044)
.0356
(.0051)
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Model Effects None None None None Random Random Random Random Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
Observations 861 861 861 861 861 861 861 861 861 861 861 861
Notes—Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the model level.
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2. Assets with faster depreciation should trade earlier “in their life.”
To investigate whether the data are consistent with this prediction, I investigate
whether the Average Age, Aircraft for Sale of aircraft-model i in year t is
correlated with the Depreciation Rate.
Table 7 reports the results of several specifications.15 Columns (1)-(4) report coeffi-
cients of OLS regressions that pool all model-year pairs; columns (5)-(8) report coeffi-
cients of random-effects panel regressions; and columns (9)-(12) report coefficients of
fixed-effects panel regressions. Overall, specifications (1)-(12) indicate that theDepre-
ciation Rate has no effect on the Average Age, Aircraft for Sale, reinforcing
the idea that replacement is not the main motive for trade in the business-aircraft mar-
ket.16
3. The fraction of aircraft sold should be lowest for the youngest vintages.
The reason is that, because of transaction costs, few households sell their assets one
year after purchasing them.
The Aircraft Transaction database reports the Average Age, Aircraft for Sale,
and I use it to investigate this prediction. However, the data are not ideally suited
to investigate it because, as described in Section 4, they are aggregated at the model-
quarter level. Hence, this aggregation could mask some important age heterogeneity
between different aircraft for sale within each model-quarter pair. Nonetheless, I pro-
vide suggestive evidence by restricting the analysis to model-quarter pairs for which
Aircraft for Sale equals one: For this restricted sample, there is obviously no
age heterogeneity within a model-year pair. Figure 7 plots the histogram of the age
of aircraft for sale of this restricted sample, showing that the youngest vintages are
frequently for sale. This pattern contradicts the evidence from other asset markets
in which replacement purchases are the main motives for trade. For example, in the
car market, the fraction of cars sold is lowest for the youngest vintages (Porter and
Sattler, 1999; Stolyarov, 2002). Thus, while the sample restriction recommends some
caution in putting too much weight on this evidence, Figure 7 further corroborates
that replacement is not the main motive for trade.
15The number of observations in Table 7 is lower than those in Table 6 becauseAverage Age, Aircraft
for Sale is missing in years in which there are no aircraft for sale.
16The negative coefficient of Log(Active Aircraft) in the more-saturated specifications (8) and (12) is
due to the fact that out-of-production aircraft are progressively scrapped as they age, thereby simultaneously
decreasing Active Aircraft and increasing the average age of the stock of aircraft.
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Table 7: The Effect of Depreciation on the Age of Aircraft for Sale
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Depreciation Rate
38.445
(38.222)
49.005
(41.626)
40.098
(37.371)
51.949
(41.101)
−34.172
(21.489)
5.347
(3.761)
−29.205
(20.683)
2.953
(3.179)
−37.154
(21.911)
5.223
(3.788)
−32.032
(21.316)
2.757
(3.157)
Log(Active Aircraft)
.9452
(1.124)
.8864
(1.139)
2.318
(.477)
−1.390
(.235)
2.359
(.529)
−1.457
(.247)
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Model Effects None None None None Random Random Random Random Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
Observations 851 851 851 851 851 851 851 851 851 851 851 851
Notes—Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the model level.
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Fig. 7: Histogram of the age of aircraft for sale.
B Computation of Standard Errors and Confidence In-
tervals
Section 4 reports that the two datasets are unbalanced panels: The transaction dataset
includes N1 = 161 models over T1 = 228 months; the aircraft prices dataset includes N2 =
72 models over T2 = 57 quarters. The aircraft price dataset also includes one additional
dimension of variation: different vintages a of model i in year t.
For ease of comparability between the two datasets, I aggregate the transaction dataset
at the quarterly level; hence, the estimation samples cover T2 = 57 quarters. Overall, I have
8, 737 observations about transactions and 30, 706 observations about prices (i.e., 30, 706
retail prices and 30, 706 transaction prices). The numbers of observations, models and time
periods indicate that the cross-sectional variability is larger than the time-series variability.
I assume that all of these observations are independent. Hence, from the transaction
datasets, I compute the moments reported in Section 6.1 of the paper by aggregating the
individual observations; for example, the aggregate fraction of aircraft for sale is computed
as
∑
Aircraft for Sale∑
Active
. I compute the variance-covariance matrix of the empirical moments of
each dataset correspondingly.
Moreover, in each of the 100 bootstrap replications, I draw with replacement 8, 737 obser-
vations from the transaction dataset and 30, 706 observations from price dataset. I estimate
the parameters separately for each replication sample, and perform the counterfactuals with
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these parameters. The reported confidence intervals consist of the third and the 98th per-
centiles of the distributions of these parameters.
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